Casus belli and topostrategy.

N. Lygeros

Translation: Paola Vagioni

Casus belli whether we want it or not, has changed meaning. Even if the Turkish National Assembly has not taken an official decision on its lifting, there is a change of phase as far as its teleology is concerned. The univocal expression has acquired a polysemy and the static position has been converted into a dynamic movement. This change activates the notion of topostrategy, since the given facts on the accessibility of the Aegean change as well. The game is at the starting point now as far as initiative is concerned. Turkey does not sign the Montego Bay Treaty but it does not contest it militarily and strategically. This means that it tries to achieve a lateral attack by sacrificing a dispute on which it insisted historically.
This artificial sacrifice, since it did not follow the international maritime law, is not a real sacrifice. It examines the cost of the static in relation to the artificial dynamic of the next movement. Topostrategy, with its repercussions on the Aegean, does not offer to it many possibilities. On the other hand, as long as Greece continues to maintain a passive position, it does not provoke substantial reactions. Without implying that there are no actions in relation to the E.E.Z. issue and the contacts with Egypt. The minimization of the threat is also a strategic indication. Giving and taking back is not equal to leaving. The selection of this mental schema has no cost and offers benefit, if the opponent considers it a movement. The interesting part of the case is the management of inertia. While apparently it is useless after the start, it carries a great weight and it can very easily be exploited by the player with initiative. It can transfer the weight not only in a more general framework, like the E.E.Z. in relation to the territorial waters, but to use it in one area where its existence is already an action. A tangible example is the issue of the recognition of genocide. Via inertia they can activate wrong reflexes as far as our placement in relation to the crimes against humanity is concerned and with the mutation of the problem to achieve also a distortion of the issue. We therefore have to clarify from the beginning that this mental schema that Turkey displays has nothing to do with the genocide issue and it must not expect from us any retreat. If we immediately disclose our positions, the issue will remain in a topostrategic framework and we will penetrate the E.E.Z. field, otherwise every movement of ours can turn into a mistake and into a cost in another framework. This is the new game and its rules.

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